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The Power Elite Model: Urban Development in Thailand and the Philippines CONTENTS Early history of the Philippines |
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v
Urban development in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur was dominated
by the respective central governments, but the remaining cities in Indonesia
and Malaysia continue to retain a strong regional identity and have resisted
central government dominance. v
The two capital cities are undisputed political and
commercial centres, but they lack the cultural legacy that is generally
associated with a “primate city”. v
Recent development of the capital cities shows
evidence of the “constellation configuration” in the formation of satellite
cities surrounding the capitals, but this has not yet become apparent with
other cities in Indonesia and Malaysia. The relatively stronger resistance to centralisation, and
the resulting regional identity, was traced to the traditional kampong-based
social structure and to the early forms of rivalry that arose from trading
activities in the coastal regions. The traditional social structure has also contributed to a
greater degree of neighbourhood identity and local-area cohesion in the urban
areas, compared to capital cities with different cultural influences. The power elite model reflects
rivalry within the social structure, rather than among or between such
structures. This often gives rise to
patron-client relationships that influence the state apparatus and therefore
influence urban development. An important contrasting feature
of the new model is the tendency to use patron-client relations to secure
personal gain or “booty” from the public sector. These relations can be formed in a variety of ways, and they
are different in Thailand as compared to the Philippines. The development of the “power
elite” is therefore treated separately for the two case studies, but in both
cases it represents a different form of centralisation in urban development
compared to the other models that were examined. |
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Cities: The capital is Bangkok
with a population of about 10 million.
Other cities are: v
Nakhon Ratchasima (2.5 million), which is 250
kilometres northeast of Bangkok on the western edge of the Khorat Plateau; v
Chiang Mai (1.6 million) in the northwestern part;
and v
Songkla (1.2 million), on the Malay Peninsula. Terrain: Densely populated
central plain; northeastern plateau; mountain range in the west; southern
isthmus joins the landmass with Malaysia. Climate: Tropical monsoon. Thailand occupies an important
part of the Indochina peninsula, with the northern portion close to southern
China. A series of parallel ranges,
with a north-south trend, are located in the northern and western portions of
the country. Extreme elevations occur
in the western ranges, which extend along the border with Myanmar. Another mountain system exists
in central Thailand and also has a north-south alignment. At its southern extremity, this system has
an east-west trend and extends to the eastern border. Between the central and western
mountains is a large alluvial plan that is traversed by the Chao Praya River,
the main river in Thailand. This
central plain, together with the fertile delta formed by the Chao Phraya near
Bangkok, is the richest agricultural land and the most densely populated
section of the kingdom. |
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Migrations from southern China
to Southeast Asia may have occurred in the 6th and 7th centuries and probably
came by way of the Black River Valley in the northern Viet Nam and the
northeastern part of the People’s Republic of Lao. Migration from southern China definitely occurred in the 11th
century. The latter migration brought a
more definite link with the Chinese and the mixture of these migrants with
the earlier settlers, particularly in the rice-growing regions, created what
is known now as the Thais. The Thai
language is closer to Chinese than to the other ethnic groups, with elements
of Cantonese and Hakka and some Tibeto-Burman influence. Similarity in language is
generally regarded as convincing evidence of ethnic ties. The migration of people into and around
relatively open areas, such as the Indochina peninsula, is typically complex
and difficult to unravel when based upon evidence other than language. The Indochina peninsula was not
consolidated into an empire (or unified civilisation) until the early part of
the 9th century when the Khmers occupied Cambodia. Thailand subsequently became part of that empire. In 1177, Angkor Wat, the centre of the
Khmer Empire, fell to the northern Vietnamese and the region became more
fragmented. Thais date the founding of their
nation to the 13th century. According
to tradition, in 1238, Thai chieftains overthrew their Khmer overlords at
Sukhothai, which is in the central region between two mountain ranges. The chieftains created a new Thai
alphabet, which became the basis for the modern Thai language. This was a relatively localised
kingdom, situated in the northern part of the alluvial plain, and was
absorbed in 1350 by the kingdom of Ayutthaya, which was centred at
the city, bearing that name, along the Chao Praya River north of present-day
Bangkok. This kingdom established the
first dynasty in Thailand that lasted from 1350 to 1767, ending with
destruction of the capital by the Burmese.
The 400-year rule firmly established Buddhism as the national religion
and a legal code based upon Hinduism and traditional customs. The Burmese overlords were
overthrown by a Thai general who proclaimed himself king. He was subsequently executed by his
ministers and the crown passed to General Pya Chakri, founder of the present dynasty
of Thai kings, who ruled from 1782 to 1809 as Rama I. A new capital on the
present site of Bangkok was built during his reign. The social organisation during
the period had elements of feudalism.
The king was an absolute monarch but depended for support upon a
relatively strong group of noblemen whose rights and privileges were granted
by the king on a customary basis, rather than through a code of law. There was apparently little or
no formal social stratification below the nobility, apart from the status
given to members of the king’s entourage.
The overall society was bound together through obedience to the king
and through the natural moral law that is associated with Buddhism. Portuguese arrived in the 16th
century. The Siamese Empire (which
was the name applied until 1938) included Laos and Cambodia at that time. The British and the French established
a presence in the 19th century, but Thailand remained free of European
domination, partly through well-developed diplomatic skills and partly
through a modernising program initiated by King Mongkuk (Rama IV) who reigned
from 1851 to 1868. Thailand nevertheless lost land
as a result of European incursion.
The French forced King Chulalongkorn to give up Cambodia and all
of Laos east of the Mekong River; and Great Britain acquired four states on
the Malay Peninsula. In addition, the Europeans changed the
economic system from production for use to production for exchange. A continuing debate among scholars focuses
on whether the European colonial system was the major force for this change,
or whether a significant portion of the Thai aristocracy anticipated the
colonial interests and formed patron-client relations with a view to
achieving personal gain. It is nevertheless agreed that commercial
activities began to flourish through the patronage of the Thai elite, and these
activities occurred almost exclusively in Bangkok. |
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In 1932, a military and
political coup transformed the Government of Thailand from an absolute to a
constitutional monarchy. King
Prajadhipok (Rama VII) initially accepted this change but later surrendered
the kingship to his 10-year old nephew.
The two people who were leaders
of the resurgents were Pridi, a statesman, and Phibun, a colonel in the Thai
military. Phibun became the first
prime minister and Pridi held various cabinet posts. During World War II, the Phibun
government negotiated with France for a return of part of the land that was
ceded in and after 1893. Japan acted
as mediator and relatively close relations between Japan and Thailand
developed when the negotiations were successful. A right of passage was granted to Japan for troops to be sent
into Burma. Thailand declared war on the US
and Great Britain in 1942. However,
Pridi resigned in protest and formed a new party that won the election in
1944. He became prime minister in
1946, but was forced to resign when King Ananda was assassinated in 1947. There was no evidence linking Pridi to the
death but he was nevertheless forced to flee to China. Phibun regained power in 1948
and ruled in a dictatorial way until 1957.
Territory gained during World War II was returned to France and Great
Britain. In September 1957, Phibun's government was overthrown by a
military coup led by Marshall Sarit Thanarat, commander in chief of the Thai
armed forces. A coalition government
was formed in January 1958 under the premiership of Lieutenant General Thanom
Kittikachorn.
Another coup in October 1958, again headed by Sarit,
overthrew the Thanom government. The
constitution was suspended, a state of martial law was proclaimed, and all
political parties were banned. Thanom
again became prime minister after Sarit’s death in 1963. Elections at the municipal level were held for the first
time in a decade in 1969, but a military government continued at the national
level until student-led demonstrations resulted in the resignation of General
Thanon in 1973 and a civilian government was appointed. New elections were held in 1976, but later that year
General Thanon returned from exile in Singapore and civil disturbances broke
out. This time an admiral gained
control and installed a conservative government, only to remove it a year
later. A military government remained in power until General Prem
was elected in 1983, followed by Chatichai in 1988. A military junta removed Chatichai in 1991, and installed an
interim civilian government headed by Anand.
Pro-military parties won the election with a former army
commander Suchinda as prime minister, but this produced demonstrations
calling for democratic reforms. Anand
was made the interim prime minister and new elections in September 1992
resulted in another coalition government with Chuan Leekpai as prime
minister. Democratic reforms
followed. Chuan’s government collapsed in May 1995, and Banharn,
leader of the Chart Thai Party became prime minister. Less than a year later, the Banharn
government faced accusations of corruption and Chavalit, another former
general, formed a coalition government.
His inability to cope with the East Asian financial crisis brought the
government down, with Chuan returning. On 6 January
2001, billionaire politician Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister when
his two-year-old Thai Rak Thai Party won a landslide victory in the general
election. It was the first time in
Thailand's history that a party had secured over 50 per cent of the seats in
parliament. Political
stability is not easily achieved, however.
Thaksin enlarged his majority by forming a coalition with the Chart
Thai Party and the New Aspiration Party, putting Chavalit in as Deputy Prime
Minister. Chavalit is expected to
retire from Parliament later this year and it is not yet certain who will
replace him. |
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Military-bureaucratic elite From 1932 to the late 1950s, political and bureaucratic
powers were fused. This arose from
the role of the military in establishing the constitutional monarchy and the
role that military personnel played in the bureaucracy. As a result, business had little or no direct influence or
political leverage on government.
Elected officials either came from the military or had military
connections. Similarly, military
personnel held key positions in the bureaucracy, intending, in many cases, to
gain experience for subsequent cabinet appointments. State institutions in Thailand at that time existed mainly
for business interests, but those interests were subject to approval of the
military-bureaucratic elite. The
progeny of the older Thai aristocracy became more diffused since the early
part of the 20th century and did not represent an identifiable social class. Client-patron relationship When Marshall Sarit took over in 1957, economic growth was
slower in Thailand than it was in neighbouring countries. This was attributed largely to the unwillingness or inability of the military-bureaucracy to introduce
policy changes. Sarit reduced the influence of
the military-bureaucracy by concentrating power in a smaller number of key
advisors, referred to as technocrats.
Their main task was to hasten economic growth and for this they needed
the cooperation of the business community. The technocrats consulted with
business interests and effectively treated them as clients (rather than as
subjects). The technocrats were the
patrons. Less stable government-business
cooperation A characteristic of a
centralised patron-client network is that it remains stable by being
exclusive. This stability contributes
to expediency in decision-making, but eventually impedes progress by
fostering the interests only of those within the exclusive group. The patron-client networks that
emerged with Marshal Sarit therefore contributed more to economic development
in the early stages of their formation, but did not succeed in maintaining
that contribution over a long period. After Sarit’s death in 1963, the
patronage gradually shifted to members of parliament and more specifically to
the elected leaders of Thailand’s political parties. It was due mainly to the desire for greater
influence by business interests that were excluded from the networks created
by Sarit. Political parties in Thailand
centre on one individual – the party leader.
Disagreements within the party elite generally result in a breakaway
group that forms a new party.
Business interests established alliances with those leaders, or with
party members who had ambitions of becoming a leader. It was essentially a
picking-the-future-winners task. Influence of the business community
in government peaked with Chatichai, though Prem is credited with laying the
foundation for this arrangement. When
that influence was considered to be excessive by the military, they stepped
in and took over. With Anand and Chuan, who were
considered to be statesmen rather than wheeling-and-dealing politicians, the
influence of the business community was reduced, but may be returning now
with Thaksin as prime minister. |
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First, since 6th century, and
perhaps before, Thailand had a highly autocratic structure with generals who
became kings by dominating rivals. To
maintain that dominance, it was necessary for the kings to secure continued
loyalty from the Thai nobles, with whom opposition could otherwise be mounted. Since the nobility did not want to forego
the possibility of contesting the throne, they would not agree to a legal
basis for royal succession. This
arrangement therefore comprised an early form of patron-client relations. Second, the European influence
in the 19th century altered the nature of production in Thailand and hence
also altered the major source of wealth.
Patron-client relations were formed between the Thai aristocracy and
the European traders. Third, the transition to a
constitutional monarchy can be attributed to a number of factors, including
the personal ambitions of were Pridi and Phibun, as well as the international
hegemony that developed in the interwar period. External patron-client relations were established between Japan
and Thailand, but were not durable. Fourth, during and for a period
after the Second World War the state was dominated by a military-bureaucratic
elite, who became the “patrons”.
Marshall Sarit changed this in 1957 by creating a group of elite
public servants and advisors, referred to as the technocracy. The patron-client relations evolving from
them also became unstable and patronage was transferred to elected members of
the Thai Parliament. Fifth, the lack of tenure among
political parties was an indication of the lack of stability in the new form
of patron-client relations. It also
conveyed Thailand’s difficulty in establishing an institutional framework
through which patronage could be monitored and maintained within acceptable
bounds. The gradual transition in
Thailand from the patron-client relations to a partner relationship has
become apparent during the past two decades.
The fact that the Thais were more entrenched with the clientelistic
form, but began to move away from it as the industrialisation process
accelerated could be taken as evidence that the earlier form of “booty
capitalism” failed to meet the requirements of a globalised environment. Nevertheless, the exclusivity
associated with patron-client relations is generally sufficient to produce
countervailing forces that contribute to instability through efforts to
topple those in power. Within the
context of the power elite model, this desire to topple is based mainly on
the desire to capture the “booty” away from those who are currently receiving
it. A major outcome of these shifts
in patron-client relations is the inability to undertake long-term planning,
either in respect of economic development or of urban development. The shifts also led to a high degree of
urban concentration in the Bangkok area, mainly as a result of the dominance
of both patrons and clients in that region.
Each of Thailand's 76 provinces, called changwats, are under
the control of a governor appointed by the Ministry of Interior, except
Bangkok Metropolis where the governor is elected by popular vote. District (amphur)
officials are also appointed. Larger
towns are governed by elected and appointed officials, and elected heads hold
power at local levels. |
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Our objective is to examine this format, comment
on it and show how it is reasonably effective in compiling information that
is useful for urban planners. We will also pick up some detailed information
about Bangkok. The principal reference is Jeffry Stubbs and Giles
Clarke (eds), Megacity Management in the Asian and Pacific Region, Volume Two: City and Country Case Studies.
Of particular relevance is Nathanon Thavisin and
Ksemsan Suwarnarat, "City Study of Bangkok". Background, trends and
conditions This is partly an
"executive summary", giving at a glance the major development
problems. For Bangkok these problems are: v
traffic congestion primarily caused by uncontrolled
growth of private cars, a low ratio of land area to road network and a
complex road system that has made it difficult for traffic enforcers; v
unplanned physical growth that extends commuting
distances and contributes to increased traffic volume across the city; v
backlogs in the provision of infrastructure
services that can be traced to the failure of the public sector to cope with
the fast pace of private-sector-led development; v
excessive levels of air and water pollution that
have exceeded the natural absorption capacities; v
environmental and accidental risks due to careless
handling of goods, machinery and facilities; and v
lack of practical guidelines for the authorities to
enforce rules and regulations effectively. It may also be noted that the tendency to establish
closely-knit neighbourhoods, as we observed for Kuala Lumpur in particular,
did not occur in Bangkok. This can be
traced to a number of factors, one of which is the more complex network of
friends, associates and patron-client relations in Thailand that extend well
beyond the local neighbourhoods. As a
result, Thais travel within the city to a greater extent. Background Bangkok was founded as the
nation's capital in 1782 by King Rama I and was referred to as "Krung
Thep Maha Nakhon". The location
was selected partly because the bends in the Chao Praya River afforded a
pocket of land for the palace and temples. Much of the early traditions of
the royalty involved barges and river travel. The city is in a low lying and relatively flat area, thus
allowing a number of canals to be constructed. In 1932, after King Rama VII
converted the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, the Thai
Administration Act and the Municipal Government Act turned Krung Thep into a
province. In 1972, the National Executive
Council amalgamated the Metropolitan City Municipality and Sanitation
Administration into the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). Beginning in 1985, the governor
was elected by popular vote and the governor appoints four deputy
governors. An Assembly of Councillors
consists of elected members, with each councillor representing 100,000
residents. BMA continues to exist but for
administrative purposes, a larger region (BMR) includes other nearby
cities. This is mainly for water
supply and treatment. Although the statistics have shown very clearly how
Bangkok has grown in size and importance in the past several decades, the
growth in the past few years has been even more striking. The urbanised area of Bangkok in 1974 was
more than twice the size of urbanised Bangkok in the early 1960s (the inner
core of old Bangkok and Thonburi), when it began to expand in earnest. By 1984, urbanised Bangkok included the fringes of
surrounding provinces. In the early
1990s, the area within a 40-kilometre radius of Bangkok Metropolis filled up
quickly with housing estates, commercial establishments, and recreational
areas such as amusement parks and golf courses. The concept of Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) or
Greater Bangkok is fast becoming outdated, and will probably be replaced by
the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region (EBMR). Recent growth rates have average
about 10 per cent per annum since 1988. Socio-economic
management Socio-economic pressures on
residents include: v
social conflicts among the traditionalists, the
contemporaries and the opportunists; v
complexity of social interconnections that are
greater than in most other cities of a similar size, v
conflicts between legitimate homes and temporary
settlements; v
disorderly (unstructured) public activities; v
accidental growth and existence; v
excessive land values; v
technology dependent high-rise buildings and high
density living; v
the aggression of motor vehicles, trucks and
motorcycles; v
the destruction of the landscape; v
the weakness of families, relative to social groups
or common-interest groups; v
apparently senseless and colourless ways of life,
as exhibited, for example, through seemingly aimless movements within the
city; v
the increasing proportion of homeless people; and v
suffering of urban poor. Environmental
management The biggest environmental
problem is air pollution, but solid waste disposal is also pressing. Water resources A large amount (about 40 per
cent) of catchment water is lost through leaks. Abduction of groundwater is
associated with land subsidence. Flood control Tidal flows are a problem, in
addition to flooding from rainfall into the river system. Local area flooding occurs from
inadequate drainage in certain low-lying areas of the BMA. The water authority publishes
flood risk maps, but enforcement is not managed well. Private developers may not heed
the risks. Wastewater Pollution of the canals or
klongs has been an on-going problem.
A modern sewage plant was initiated in 1990 and with it regulations
about connections to the sewerage system were put into effect. Large buildings are expected to
use on-site treatment plants and community plants are being planned. There is evidence that the
authority is making use of the most cost effective methods of wastewater
treatment. This includes on-site
aeration tanks that cost about US$100 per person. The principal disadvantage seems to be the space requirements
in an already overpopulated city. Solid waste
management Solid waste management is
becoming a greater problem, due to the increase in the amount of refuse and
to the longer distances needed for disposal.
Private sector composting plants have been successful, but there is not
enough of them. Transport The city suffers from the
initial construction of buildings along the klongs, many of which were
subsequently filled in as streets.
Thus, a complex set of lanes and "soi" exists. Travel time for pushbikes is
known to be substantially less than that for motor vehicles. The increased distance for many
commuters (too far for bikes), the focal point of the city's concentration
(the "old" part of the city) and the absence of long-term planning
for transport make it a chronic problem. Many analysts consider this to
be Bangkok’s major problem since air pollution is part of the transport
problem. Urban poor Slums consist of low income
housing (dense, small, irregular, owner-built temporary or semi-permanent
dwellings) on land that is rented on a short-term basis. Quality of the services is often
low, due partly to the density and partly to the lack of permanency
(increasing the risk of non-payment to the supplier of the services). Half of the low-income housing
is within 6.5 km of the CBD. Between 15 and 20 per cent of
the population has lived in slums since 1940. Eviction and resettlement create
new slums. Existing rural areas frequently
become slums as the city incorporates them. City planning requires a
reduction in the area occupied by slums since it could otherwise lead to a
deterioration of recently developed areas. Slums cannot be eliminated in
Bangkok (and in other Asian cities) since some residents prefer to minimise
the cost of housing even if their income permits better housing. Land management Thailand, and Bangkok, has not
done well in land management. There
are several reasons for which, including poor coordination among the
implementing agencies within government. Complex land titling, procedures
for land subdivision, system of taxes and private sector dominance in land
development also contribute. There are difficulties in
government acquisition of land for public uses. Land titles are effectively
land-use rights giving the holder the capacity to recover the costs of improvements. Traditionally all land belong to
the King. Thai nobility were given
the right to use the land in whatever way they saw fit. Once land-use rights were
granted, they were rarely revoked. Peace, simplicity and
tranquillity were traditionally prized attributes and the Thai royalty was
consistently reluctant to endanger this by upsetting the nobility. Some of this reluctance is
visible today in the Thai Parliament. The lack of long-term planning
in Thailand can be attributed to the relatively short tenure of elected
governments. Although this is
changing for municipal governments, largely through an enlarging proportion
of middle-class residents, the Ministry of Interior continues to exert
influence on municipal affairs. Since there is no effective control on land use in
Bangkok, the development and urbanisation of Bangkok have brought about a
haphazard, free-for-all pattern of land use.
Residential houses are mixed with commercial buildings and
factories, all of various shapes and sizes.
Until early 1992, Bangkok did not have an official city plan in
operation, so a comprehensive city structure, zoning, building control,
public utility layouts, and so on, could not be drawn up. The municipal government has the power to regulate certain
aspects of land use, building construction and zoning, but the system is
piecemeal and not well integrated. Horizontally, the city is spreading along the new roads
that are opened up to accommodate the larger urban population and business
establishments. This is sometimes
referred to as "ribbon development". Vertically, high-rise blocks of units and business offices
appear rapidly in the inner part of the city without much coordination with
basic infrastructure such as frontage access, drainage, and waste management
systems. Government administration In relation to the management of the extended BMR, The
Thai Development Research Institute recommended that a new national-level
committee be established and charged with the responsibility of setting
policy within the extended BMR and managing it. This could be an upgraded Bangkok Metropolitan Region
Development Committee (BMRDC), which is already in charge of coordinating the
urban policy of the BMR. It was
recommended that the Extended BMRDC (or EBMRDC) would be headed by the prime
minister, and committee members would consist of high-level officials so that
decisions that affect the responsibilities of various government agencies can
be effectively implemented. To be successful, the EBMRDC needs to be assisted by a
strong secretariat that has the capability of (a) planning the integrated
development of the EBMR; (b) coordinating with various agencies having
responsibility for development within the EBMR; and (c) evaluating major
infrastructure projects in the EBMR to ensure that they are
socio-economically beneficial and are consistent with the desired development
directions of the EBMR. As was noted previously, Thailand has a high degree of
centralisation in urban development.
The agglomeration into an EBMR would appear to represent an even
greater amount of centralisation.
However, it is also important to remove the Ministry of Interior from
supervision and control of local governments in Thailand. This control is exerted principally by means of its fiscal
authority. City governments need
greater revenue and expenditure autonomy in order to serve the needs of their
respective populations. The main obstacle seems to be the entrenched attitude of
the Ministry of the Interior in trying to hold on to the power to control
local governments. In terms of urban
development, this represents another form of patron-client relations that has
persisted over a relatively long period of time. Until there is a genuine
change in the autonomy of city governments in Thailand, management of the
urban areas will continue to be slow and indecisive. |
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Subsequently, Austronesians came from the south in
successive waves from about 200 BC.
These Malayo-Polynesians settled in scattered communities, which were
ruled by chieftains. Tagalog, the most common language within the Philippines
(originally from an ethnic group called the Tagalogs) is similar to the
official language in Indonesian and Malaysia. There is evidence of Chinese merchants and traders
arriving and settling in the 9th century AD. The Philippine archipelago was influenced by the
Indonesian kingdoms and the southern islands of the Philippines experienced
the introduction of Islamic religion in the 14th century. The Austronesians remained the dominant
group until the Spanish arrived in the 16th century. Magellan was the first European to discover the
Philippines in 1521 and it became part of the Spanish Conquest in 1564. The islands were named after Phillip, the
King of Spain. Spanish influence became substantial, particularly with a
strong central government and direct participation of the dominant religious
orders. The Austronesians in the
archipelago were ultimately converted to Roman Catholicism but the influence
did not blend easily with Malayo-Polynesian customs. This cultural intrusion was more dramatic
in the Philippines than that experienced in Indonesia and Malaysia. Spanish colonisation consisted of a relatively small
number of government administrators, together with a substantial military
force and churchmen (priests and monks).
Spanish nobility acquired land in the Americas, but relatively few
journeyed to the Philippines. Hence,
Spaniards-in-residence in the Philippines were predominately male. Inter-marriages occurred, with ethnic Spanish families rising to the top
of the social structure. The term Filipino originally denoted a person
of Spanish descent born in the Philippines and was comparable to the term Creole in the Spanish-American colonies. The term was subsequently applied to the
Austronesians who were converted to Christianity, and this comprises the bulk
of the Philippine population. The original Filipinos nevertheless created a social
legacy. Within the Spanish colonial
system, with inter-marriages performed and recognised by the Church, Filipinos
obtained land-grants and became a landed gentry. Discipline in the treatment of peasant farmers who worked
the land was imposed by the Catholic Church and, with the conversion of the
peasants, the church inculcated a strong sense of family responsibility. This ended the Austronesian tradition of
the kampong as the basic unit in the social structure, and created a distinct
break away from the customs that persisted in Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result, the social
structure was remarkably stable in the Philippines, with a highly
paternalistic attitude displayed by the landed gentry and a strong sense of
loyalty toward the gentry on the part of the peasants. This represented a form of patron-client
relations. |
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At that time, the US acquired Cuba as a protectorate along
with Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines.
A payment of US$20 million was made for the Philippines. Filipinos resisted the transfer of power and until
recently the hostilities were referred to as "the Philippine
Insurrection". In the both the
US and the Philippines it is now referred to as the Philippine-American War
(1899-1902). American colonisation of the Philippines is sometimes
characterised as having been mildly indifferent. This can be attributed to several factors: v
As a result of the considerable distance between
the Philippines and the continental US, the territory did not comprise a
strategic interest until the interwar period. v
The territory was administered by the Department of
the Interior, which had more important tasks within the continental US. As a result, the number of colonial
administrators was relatively small and failed to provide a “model” for
government administration. v
Although the US administrators were dissatisfied
with the lack of a separation between the church and the state, which was a
legacy of the Spanish, they were generally unwilling to openly oppose the
influence of the Catholic Church. The administrative reforms initiated by the US colonial
powers were therefore relatively subtle.
They attempted to remove social class distinctions in both education
and the public service. The first was
successful in raising the level of literacy, but the second was generally counter-productive
to the future development of the Philippines. Entry into the public service was based upon open
examinations, but the public service itself remained unstructured in terms of
a code of conduct and a system of organisational loyalties. As a result, patron-client relations
between public servants and the landed gentry were easily formed, as there
was no obvious alternative. Although the scale of investment by US corporations in the
Philippines was relatively low until after World War II, a culture of trade
was nevertheless established under US administration. Major exports from the Philippines
consisted of sugar and cane furniture.
Manufactured goods were imported from the US, thus
representing the more typical type of colonial trading system. However, the volume of this trade was
substantially less than that associated with Puerto Rico and Hawaii which
were much closer to US markets. Loyalty on the part of the Filipinos was nevertheless
transferred fairly quickly from the Spanish to the Americans and invasion by
the Japanese in World War II was fiercely resisted. This external factor interrupted American efforts to achieve a
relatively smooth transition from colonial rule to autonomy and then to independence. These efforts were further complicated after the war by
the shift in US concern to Northeast Asia following the emergence of Mao
Zedong in China and the Korean War.
As a former colony, the Philippines failed to retain tariff
concessions on sugar exported to the US and received less in the way of
foreign aid than Taiwan or South Korea. |
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The “green revolution” that occurred after World War II,
as a result of more intensive research and development of hybrid plants,
chemical fertilisers, pesticides and agricultural machinery, resulted in a
decline world prices for agricultural exports. Like other developing countries, the Philippines recognised the
need to industrialise and became the first Southeast Asian nation to do so
successfully. The success can be attributed mainly to the capacity of
the landed gentry to exploit the new agricultural technology. The scale of farming with the relatively
large landholdings enabled the technology to be used more effectively, as
compared to the much smaller holdings in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Perhaps more importantly, the wealthier status of the
landed gentry in the Philippines enabled the technology to be purchased more
easily. The resulting benefits
created a substantial surplus of agricultural output and increased by the
wealth and family savings of this group of Filipinos. As noted above, however, the “green revolution” resulted
in declining export prices and the wealthy families realised that the
windfall in income could not be maintained through rural activities. They therefore became the new
industrialists in the Philippines. These industrialists sought protection through tariffs and
quotas to allow their manufacturing activities to develop. This intensified the patron-client
relations that were initiated during the inter-war period between the landed
gentry and the public servants. The system of government in the Philippines was more or
less imposed by the colonial administrators and followed closely the American
system of two houses of congress and a popularly elected president. As mentioned previously, the transition to
independence, and the full development of state institutions to maintain such
as system was interrupted and was generally incomplete at the time of independence. As a result, patron-client relations dominated the
political system. The wealthy
Filipino families competed against each other in industrial production but
maintained considerable cohesion in restricting political influence to
members of the wealthy-family group.
This ultimately led to an oligarchy.
The wealthy families generally dominated the upper house
of the legislature. The lower house
and the popularly elected president tended to reflect voter dissatisfaction
with the previous administration.
This is illustrated by the following list of presidents and their
respective agendas: Ramon Magsaysay (1946-1957) v
land reform started v
interfered with landed gentry and lost election v
emphasis on redistribution income and wealth in
favour of the poor Carlos Garcia (1957-1961) v
favoured Filipino-first policies v
used import substitution to promote domestic
industry v
industrial development promoted v
emphasised redistribution of income in favour of
big business Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) v
sought to expand Philippine ties to its Asian
neighbours v
implemented domestic reform programs v
promoted an open economy and laissez-faire policies v
opened manufacturing to foreign enterprises v
sought redistribution of income in favour of labour Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) v
promoted state intervention v
attempted to “pick the winners” v
declared martial law in 1972 v
began a process of political normalisation during
1978-81, ended martial law in 1981 v
re-elected to a 6-year term that would have ended
in 1987 v
retained wide arrest and detention powers during
the 1980s v
corruption and favouritism contributed to a serious
decline in economic growth and development v
pushed for redistribution of income in favour of
his cronies Cory Aquino (1986-1992) v
installed as president when a civilian-military
uprising forced Marcos to flee after an election that was characterized by
widespread fraud v
she was the wife opposition leader Benigno Aquino,
who as assassinated in 1983 and helped to form the United Nationalist
Democratic Organisation (UNIDO) v
revitalised but did not fully reform democratic
instititutions v
promoted non-confrontational politics v
concentrated on easing the foreign debt v
made an effort to keep MNEs in the Philippines v
prevented income distribution from getting worse. Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) v
held positions in Marcos’ government, but resigned
when allegations of corruption became widespread v
served in the Aquino government and was picked as
Aquino’s successor v
concentrated on economic efficiency v
privatised many of the government enterprises v
attempted battle with the oligopolies Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) v
vice president under Ramos, but had different party
affiliation v
won a landslide victory v
returned to a more flamboyant style of presidency v
generated concerns about a return to cronyism and
corruption v
perceptions of weak governance, lack of policy
direction v
legislation proceeded more slowly compared to
Ramos' government Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001 – present
time) v
formerly a senator and became Vice President in the
May 1998 elections v
is the 8th president after independence and is the
daughter of Diosdado Macapagal, the third president after independence v
main support is from upper and middle class voters v
has the backing of the military and former
president Ramos is a strong supporter v
policies are not yet clear, but is currently
committed to a reform of the tax system and will probably put poverty
alleviation and distribution of income on the agenda to avoid continuing
social unrest Although the political system is more stable than in Thailand, this can be attributed mainly to stability among the power elite, which consists of wealthy families whose social and economic status can be traced to the landed gentry in the Spanish colonial period. The swings in government policy, as is apparent from the
attention given by successive administrations to dismantle the structure
created by their respective incumbents, can be attributed to the incomplete
set of democratic institutions during the American colonial period. The devotion to dismantling substantially hindered the economic
development of the Philippines and resulted in “losing the lead” within
Southeast Asia. The desire to persist
in this counter-productive activity can be traced to the patron-client
relations and to the strong desire of the wealthy families to retain the
status quo. |
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An illustration of this is the way in which the Chinese
were effectively assimilated within the respective social systems. Although the Thais had a closer relation
to the Chinese, as result of the proximity to China, the perceived need of
the Chinese to become an integral part of the social structure is also
evident in the Philippines. Manila was an important port in the trade between China
and Mexico beginning in the 16th century.
Chinese seamen and merchants established an economically important
community in Manila and in Cebu during that period. Upon observing the strength of the social structure, and
the nature of the patron-client relations, many of the Chinese converted to
Catholicism and Buddhism in the Philippines and Thailand, respectively,
inter-married and changed their names to conform to the local practices. There were other factors that influenced this
assimilation, but the features of a rule by the dominant elite, combined with
the greater capacity of the Chinese to become “clients” in the Philippines
and Thailand, nevertheless acts as one of the distinguishing characteristics
in comparison with Indonesia and Malaysia where the Chinese retained a more
traditional identity. Additionally, we noted above that in Thailand from 1932 to the late 1950s, political and
bureaucratic powers were fused. This
did not occur in the Philippines, mainly because the US colonial
administration established a public service that remained independent of the
military. Nevertheless, during the
same period, the Philippine bureaucracy was more closely aligned with the landed gentry than with elected officials. |
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The Manila metropolitan area, or Metro Manila, officially called the
National Capital Region, comprises an area of 636 square kilometres and
includes Manila proper, Quezon City, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, and the
municipalities of Las Piñas, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinglupa,
Navotas, Parañaque, Pasig, Pateros, San Juan del Monte, Taguig, and
Valenzuela. A small Muslim settlement named Maynilad was located in the vicinity
of present-day Manila when the Spaniards arrived in 1571. The city's name, shortened first to
Maynila and then to Manila, is thought to have been derived from a flowering
shrub that once grew extensively on the banks of the Pasig River. Mountains surround Manila on three sides, with the fourth open to the
sea. The bay is picturesque and was
understandably an easy choice of the Spaniards for their prime location. Manila is by far the largest metropolitan area in the Philippines, and
the second largest in Southeast Asia after Jakarta. About 12 percent of the population of the Philippines is
concentrated in the Manila metropolitan area. As a comparison, the population of the nation's second largest
metropolitan area, Cebu, is only about one-eighth that of Manila. The
metropolitan area has experienced rapid population growth through substantial
rural-to-urban migration after World War II.
During the 1960s and 1970s annual rates of population growth in
metropolitan Manila approached 5 percent, compared to national growth rates
of less than 3 percent. While the
overall growth rate slowed to 2.8 percent during the 1980s (compared to the
national rate of 2.3 percent), most of the outlying suburban areas of
metropolitan Manila grew much more rapidly.
Manila proper actually lost population to the suburbs during this
period. This rapid
population growth led to overcrowding, traffic congestion, pollution, and
housing shortages. By some estimates,
for example, between one-quarter and one-third of the city's population lives
in slums and squatter housing. At the
1990 census, Manila proper had a population of 1,601,234, and the
metropolitan area registered 7,948,392 people. Intramuros,
the original city founded in 1571 by the Spaniards, is located on the
southern bank of the Pasig River. It
includes examples of 17th-century Spanish architecture and an encircling wall
that was begun in 1590. Near Intramuros is the port area and Rizal Park, which was designed by
the American architect and urban planner Daniel H. Burnham. Roxas Boulevard, which runs along
the bay is the location of many of the older buildings and landmarks. Newer suburbs include Quezon City, Pasig,
and Makati. The
urban poor live in numerous slums and squatter areas that appear throughout
the peripheral areas, and in some older areas of the city. Tondo, located north of Intramuros and
close to the North Harbour area, is considered to be one of the largest
slums. Squatter settlements are also
visible in the landfill portions along Roxas Boulevard. |
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http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/ Asiaweek’s data on
major cities in Asia is also useful: http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek Other useful
references include the following: Jeffry Stubbs and Giles Clarke (eds), Megacity Management in the Asian
and Pacific Region, Volume Two: City and Country Case Studies, Asian
Development Bank, 1995. A United Nations publication is
also useful, for which several chapters are available at: Global influences on
urbanization trends, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0v.htm Urban population, settlement
patterns, and employment distribution http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0w.htm The international dimension of
the changing urban system, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0x.htm The internal dimensions of the
changing urban system, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0y.htm The urbanisation of Bangkok: Its
prominence, problems, and prospects, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0z.htm Other references are included on
the outline for the subject. |
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