The Australia-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry of New South Wales

Newsletter No. 15

25 February 2000

 

 

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CONTENTS

Chamber Announcements

Update for January 2000

ChinaOnline Commentaries

Sources of Information

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ACCCI ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER NO. 15

This issue of the Chamber's E-Letter has no specific focus. We mentioned in E-Letter No. 14 that conditions in China are changing rapidly. News releases that appeared shortly after we compiled the information for that E-Letter indicated that conditions are changing even more rapidly than we thought. Part of this issue is devoted to a brief summary of these changes. Some of our earlier comments are already "out of date".

We continue to add opinions and analysis to the news items, mainly because all major Internet information services are providing summaries. Daily and weekly summaries by ChinaOnline are particularly useful.

We also draw your attention to several informative commentaries that appeared recently in ChinaOnline. Those who are interested should read the complete commentaries before they are archived. We give information below to stimulate that interest.

 

 

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CHAMBER ANNOUNCEMENTS

THURSDAY 16 MARCH 2000

6.30 TO 9.30 p.m.

Guest speaker is Mr Kyle Wilson, formerly Head of Economics Section, Australian Embassy, Beijing. His topic is "CHINA IN THE YEAR OF THE DRAGON: A DIPLOMAT'S EXPECTATION".

Kyle has recently completed a four-year posting as Counsellor (Economic) for Australia in China where he travelled extensively and was responsible for economic analysis and advice to the Australian Government and private companies. In early April he takes the post as Head of the China Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.

Previous postings overseas included Poland from 1981 to 1983, where he followed the rise of the Solidarity Movement, and then subsequently the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1993, where he reported on the rise of Yeltsin as President of Russia.

THE THAI CONNECTION RESTAURANT

12 Fitzroy Street, Kirribilli (telephone: 9955 6088)

$35 per head for food only

Seating is limited. For reservations: ACCCI Dinner, GPO Box 3671, Sydney NSW 1044.

Telephone: 9451 3130; fax: 9451 3575.

 

 

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UPDATE FOR JANUARY 2000

TRADE SECTOR

China's exports rose by 47.8 per cent in January compared to the same period in 1999. This rise is substantially more than was expected a few weeks ago. Perhaps of greater importance, the rise was attributed to general exports, rather than to processed exports. As we noted previously, processed exports generally have a high import content and therefore add less to GDP per export dollar.

A second trend is also of interest. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) overtook foreign companies in terms of China's January exports. SOE exports increased by 53.5 per cent (on an annual basis) and accounted for more than half of total exports in January.

January exports were valued at RMB 138.94 billion (US$16.8 billion), while imports increased to RMB 126.53 billion (US$15.3 billion). Although the resulting trade surplus was slightly below expectations, it nevertheless amounted to RMB 12.41 billion (US$1.5 billion), and therefore remains substantial. [China Foreign Trade Up 50% in January, ChinaOnline, 21 February 2000.]

China's interbank foreign exchange turnover increased by 57 per cent in January compared to the same period in 1999. This is largest monthly figure since September 1998. The increase in foreign trade was the principal causal influence. [China's For-ex Interbank Turnover Surges In January, ChinaOnline, 21 February 2000.]

DOMESTIC ECONOMY

China's industrial growth in January rose to 8.9 per cent compared with the first month of 1999, which is above the average for 1999. In line with SOE's rise in exports, their contribution to GDP was greater than that of share-holding enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises. [Industrial Growth Rate Accelerates, China Daily, 22 February 2000.]

Data for one month are of course not sufficient to establish a trend. Moreover, SOE's may have been in a better position to make use of the recent increases in export tax rebates, in which case the surge in export activity for those enterprises may be a once-only phenomenon. Trading activities of SOE's should nevertheless be monitored this year. If their export expansion continues, it will reduce the fiscal burden and lower the strain on the financial sector that those enterprises created in the past.

During January, retail prices moved upward in 12 regions including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong. [Consumer Price Index Moves Upward, China Daily, 22 February 2000.] The increase is apparently due to a boost in consumer spending on non-food items, and not to increases in import prices as we foreshadowed in E-Letter No. 14. Oversupply of food and certain commodities continues to occur in China.

FINANCIAL SECTOR

We suggested earlier that perceived weaknesses in China's financial sector could be a disincentive for foreign direct investment. We also noted that Premier Zhu Rongji issued a directive to the major trading banks in China to institute reforms quickly. This was motivated mainly by the prospect of greater competition as a result of China's negotiated concessions for entry into the World Trade Organisation.

Recent announcements indicate that each of the Big Four state banks (the Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank, and China Construction Bank) will have a supervisory committee appointed by the State Council. These committees will assume the duties and responsibilities of boards of directors. [New Panels Will Keep Tabs on Managers of Big Four, South China Morning Post, 22 February 2000].

Since the presidents of the Big Four state banks are well connected politically, members of the supervisory committees must carry equal standing in order to act as effective checks and balances. With the strong backing of Zhu Rongji, whose personal standing within the Chinese hierarchy appears to be rising with the prospects of entry into the WTO this year, it is likely that the requirements for effective banking boards can be met. This is one more thing to watch during 2000.

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China announced early this year that they intended to increase the proportion of loans to foreign-funded enterprises and private enterprises "in areas where these enterprises are developing soundly". [ICBC Looks Beyond State Sector, China Daily, 30 January 2000.

We noted earlier that large state-owned enterprises in critical industries received the lion's share of the bank credit in China. This is likely to continue, but new loans to SOEs in traditional Industries that are not performing well will be reduced, thus allowing more scope for loans to the non-state sector.

 

 

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CHINAONLINE COMMENTARIES

An Election With Chinese Characteristics. By James A. Robinson, University of West Florida.

The author observed recent elections in Hebei Province as part of a team from the Carter Centre. The opinions he expressed in the commentary are therefore based upon "on the ground" experience.

The relevance of the commentary arises from the belief, held by many Westerners, that economic and social reforms in China will stall soon unless there are counterpart reforms to the political system. China's strategy has been to initiate political reform from the bottom up, that is, to start at the village level. This differs from the more "top down" reform in the former Soviet Union.

Remember that villages in China are (generally) not incorporated. That is, they are not legal entities, they cannot incur debt and their revenue comes principally from grants from the county-level governments. Nevertheless, village committees are acquiring greater responsibility in allocating those funds and in influencing the quality and quantity of services that are provided by the county-level governments.

Some of Robinson's observations are as follows:

·         Millions of peasants in more than 800,000 villages can now go to the polls to elect the members of their local committees. These elections have been held since 1987, with some provinces having had as many as five rounds of voting, and a few even six. According to Zhan Chengfu, the co-ordinator of basic rural governance for the Ministry of Civil Affairs, all but a handful of villages have held at least one election.

·         Each voter has the same voting power as all others, casting one vote for chair and one for vice chair and as many votes as there are committee seats to be filled. Proxy votes are accepted in some villages, but the number of proxies held by any one individual is limited.

·         In many villages, the interaction between the electorate and the elected officials is minimal. The "town meeting" spirit of engagement is missing.

·         The Chinese Communist Party no longer has a monopoly in relation to the system of nominating candidates for the village committees. In most cases, any resident of the village may be nominated, and the ones with the most nominating votes are placed on the ballot.

·         Links with the Party continue, however, since the committee chairperson (the unofficial village mayor) is normally elected as Party Secretary and half of his salary is paid from Party funds.

How significant are these observations? It is not surprising that most villagers in China take a relatively passive stance toward the electoral process. Traditions based upon more than 2000 years without "grass roots" democracy will probably not be changed within one generation.

An important element seems to be the willingness to allow the "bottom up" political reform to proceed at a pace that is set at the bottom rather than at the top. The Chinese law courts have allowed suits to be brought against officials who acted against the best interests of villagers, and have upheld the villagers' right to nominate candidates of their choice.

These actions were initiated at the village level, indicating that greater participation in the political process is possible, within limits, if villagers choose to do so. We could speculate that if village-level democracy proceeds in this way -- with increased participation in a stable and consistent way -- then elections for the next higher administrative level could be put on the agenda. It is not possible, however, to know when that will occur.

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Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity. By Pitman B. Potter, University of British Columbia

The contradictory elements with quanxi and the legal system arise from the belief that personal relationships and networks, cultivated over a period of time, are sustained through lack of faith in the legal system. According to that view, the continuation of guanxi is evidence of a weakness (and may perpetuate it) in the institutions for managing social, economic and political relations and for allocating resources.

The complementary elements involve the possibility of mutual support for the traditional guanxi system and the "increasingly formal set of largely imported rules and processes made necessary by the increased complexity of social, economic and political relations. Thus, guanxi can be viewed as an asset that can be banked or deployed as needed to serve the interests of the holder in the context of a larger institutional system."

The author considers these views on the basis of research on legal culture in Chinese urban communities, as well through analysis of case reporting on disputes between foreign and Chinese companies. Finally, a series of informal conversations held with Chinese lawyers and arbitrators during 1997-1999 and the review of documents related to business negotiations and dispute resolution over the same period are used to form an opinion.

He concludes that there is a close interplay of mutual support between guanxi relations and the role of formal institutions. He expects this complementary relationship to continue.

One of the most convincing reasons for a complementary relationship is the apparent need to adopt formal law and legal institutions in China to local conditions, and the use of a mediating mechanism to "prevent rigid application of rules to the detriment of substantive fairness."

To add an additional comment that did not fall directly into Potter's objectives: To the extent that guanxi dynamics exists because of the current limits in the formal structure of rules and procedures in China, further development of that formal structure will broaden those limits and, presumably, render guanxi dynamics less valuable. Thus, while complementarity between quanxi dynamics and formal rules and institutions may continue for the foreseeable future, the importance of quanxi in that relationship may be reduced over time.

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Foreign Investment in China's Internet Business: Forbidden, Forgiven, Forced Open? By Xing Fan, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Considerable confusion has persisted in relation to China's intended regulation (post WTO discussions) of its Internet activities. The overall policy appears to be maintained, despite announced concessions that would appear to be inconsistent with the policy. New regulations added to the confusion.

The commentary by Xing Fan serves mainly to identify where the confusion exists. It traces recent developments in relation to China's policy and comments from Minister Wu.

It is impossible to summarise the commentary in a few paragraphs. One thought that emerged, however, is that China's current regulatory stance is not likely to comply either with WTO entry agreements or with the desire to update China's IT industry. One statement, in particular, is worth noting:

Some Chinese policy makers and Internet executives have argued that in the high technology area, capital itself is no longer a controlling power. Instead, knowledge, expertise, human resources, and the prevailing legal and economic systems matter more. Foreign investment not only brings in capital, but also provides Internet players in China with access to these crucial elements.

Increased foreign investment or greater scope for strategic alliances would therefore seem to be necessary to satisfy China's IT objectives.

 

 

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION

ChinaOnline: http://www.chinaonline.com/

China Daily and China Business Weekly: http://chinadaily.com.cn.net

South China Morning Post: http://www.scmp.com

The commentaries in ChinaOnline can be obtained by clicking the "commentary" panel in their home page.

 

Send comments about this E-Letter to: j.zerby@unsw.edu.au

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