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The Australia-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry of New South Wales |
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LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA For the International Seminar on the Environment of Law Enforcement
Supervision 27-29 June 2000 Mianyang City, Sichuan Province Submitted by: The Australia-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
New South Wales Written by: John Zerby, Vice President of the Australia-China Chamber
of Commerce and Industry of New South Wales and John Yuhong Wang, Chief Representative, Beijing, of the
Australia-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry of New South Wales |
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The Australia-China Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of New South (which is more easily abbreviated as
ACCCI, or the “Chamber”) is grateful for the invitation to participate in this
international seminar on the environment of law enforcement supervision in
China. Our objective is to contribute
some thoughts to the issues that comprise the theme of the seminar and to
offer our support for the continuing discussion of these issues. ACCCI was established in Sydney
on 16 September 1976. Its purpose is
to foster two-way trade, commerce, industry, investment and cultural
relations between the two countries.
Since the first years following the establishment of diplomatic
relations with China in 1972, two-way trade grew from A$158 million to A$10.7
billion in 1999. With Australia's
population of 19.1 million, this is equivalent to A$560 (US$340) per
person. That amount is only slightly
less than for the two-way trade between China and the United States, which
was US$346 per person in the U. S. in 1999.1 Australia has traditionally been
an important supplier of the industrial raw materials and foodstuffs China
needs for its modernisation. About 61
per cent of Australian merchandise exports to China are primary products and
consist principally wool, wheat, sugar, barley, cotton, iron ore, alumina and
coal. In recent years, there has been
an increase in manufactured exports such as electrical machinery and appliances
and telecommunications equipment.
Exports of services, especially from Australian banks, law firms and
insurance companies are also increasing.2 These trends, as well as the
growing evidence of economic complementarities between Australia and China, are certain to increase with
continued restructuring of the Chinese economy. Participation in this important discussion is therefore
consistent with the Chamber's objective of fostering two-way trade and
investment. |
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The preparation of this paper
illustrates the nature of the partnerships that the Chamber has
fostered. John Zerby, who is vice
president of ACCCI, is an academic economist specialising in various development
issues of the East Asian economies, including the Chinese economy. His contribution to this paper is in
proposing a framework for reform of law enforcement supervision. John Yuhong Wang, chief
representative of ACCCI in Beijing, is a partner in a law firm in
Beijing. He has law degrees from the
University of Beijing as well as the University of Sydney. He is a business migration agent for
Australia and also specialises in company law in China. His contribution to this paper is in
adding a more detailed discussion of China’s legal issues, including
administrative enforcement of NPC laws. |
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Following the World Bank's
definitions, we use the word “state” to refer to the set of institutions that
possess the means of legitimate coercion that is exercised over a defined
territory and its population.3 Although the word “government” is sometimes used in a more
restrictive way in referring to the people who occupy positions of authority,
we use the two words interchangeably. The public sector consists of
all people who are employed by the state and whose main income is derived
from public funds. These funds
consist of tax revenues as well as income accruing to the state from
government enterprises. The public
sector does not include employees of enterprises which may be partly or fully
owned by the state but whose managerial decisions are made independently of
the state. A main function of the state is
to assist in satisfying the economic and social needs of the people within
its territory.4
This is generally achieved through two separate but related
activities. The first is establishing
a set of rules that authorise and regulate the behaviour of all participants
in the economic and social processes.
The second is the implementation of these rules in an efficient and
effective way. The portion of the public sector
that sets the rules includes legislative authorities, such as national and
sub-national people's congresses, as well as senior administrative personnel
who have been delegated the authority to set rules and regulations. The tasks of this portion of the public
sector are (1) to accurately assess the economic and social needs of the
population and (2) to establish rules and regulations that are effective in
achieving those needs. The portion of the public sector
that implements the rules and regulations is sometimes referred to as the
operational component of the state apparatus. Although these groups or agencies within the government take
instructions from the authorising and regulatory authorities, considerable
discretion typically occurs in the way, and in the speed, with which the instructions
are followed. Perhaps of greater
importance, the capacity of this portion of the public sector to implement
the rules and regulations is a critical element in the success of both
portions of the state apparatus. A simple diagram can be used to
show the relationship between these functions 5 (Fig
1). The nation's economic and social
needs are represented within the circle on the left-hand side. The circle on the right-hand side
represents the authorising and regulatory function of the state. The relatively small overlap with the two
circles indicates that the state is directly concerned with a correspondingly
small portion of the nation's economic and social needs. The remaining needs are supplied without
assistance from the state. Fig. 1. Pubic sector functions
and economic and social needs.
The third circle represents the
implementation function of the public sector and its overlap with the other
two circles (the shaded area) shows the portion of the nation's economic and
social needs that are successfully met with both authorisation and
implementation. The efficiency and
effectiveness of the public sector can therefore be assessed by the size of
the shaded area relative to the resource costs associated with the two
functions. Prior to the beginning of
economic reform in China in 1979, large portions of the nation's economic and
social needs were supplied directly by the state. This resulted from the fact that the state was the only
effective supplier. Authorisation and
implementation were closely related through central planning, and rules
consisted mainly of output targets combined with input quotas. Despite a relatively large
shaded area in relation to public sector functions under the pre-reform
arrangement, the economic costs were large and increased over time. This was due mainly to the difficulty in
matching output targets with the economic needs of the nation (mismatch
between supply and demand). The
arrangement also limited technological development since this cannot be
effectively entered into a central plan. Economic reform was initiated
for the purpose of allowing markets to develop in China and through this
development to correct the mismatches between supply and demand. The “open door” policy served the
important function of allowing a greater amount of technology transfer. The overwhelming success of these early
reforms (in the 1980s) resulted in a rightward movement of the authorising
and regulatory circle in Fig. 1, as a greater proportion of economic and
social needs were supplied without direct involvement of the state. The implementation circle also
shifted downward with increased progress in economic reform. The reasons can be traced to (1)
uncertainty about authorisation and regulation with the discontinuation of a
central plan, and (2) increased complexities arising from a mixture of market
outcomes and regulatory outcomes. China's three-tiered system of
authorisation and implementation also contributed to greater implementation
difficulties. The central government
was the first to withdraw from direct involvement and delegated much of the
economic decision-making to lower levels of government. Some implementation functions were
therefore either partly or fully duplicated within the various levels. This decentralisation was an
essential element in breaking away from central planning. It also conveyed the general belief that
lower levels of government are more aware of the economic and social needs of
the people within their respective territories. Additionally, being closer to local markets, lower levels of
government were expected to have a greater capacity to assist in adjusting
local supplies to those markets. The success of the initial
reforms can be attributed more to the incentives built into the reforms than
to the capacity of the public sector to implement them. For example, the family responsibility
system assured rural families of greater income through increases in state
procurement prices and a capacity for sideline products that could be sold on
the open market. The desire to
sustain this higher income gave rise to improvements in production methods. Similarly, allowing state-owned
enterprises to sell over-quota production on the open market, and to retain a
large portion of the proceeds of those sales, created a strong incentive to
comply with the industrial reforms.
As well, fiscal responsibility on the part of lower levels of
government in China was encouraged through a system that allowed a greater
portion of additional revenue to be retained at the lower levels. During the 1990s, financial
incentives for compliance with continuing reforms became more difficult to
achieve. For example, many township
and village enterprises could not afford the cost of complying with environmental
regulations and were forced to close down.
Similarly, many state-owned
industrial enterprises continued to incur debt as a result of lower profits
with market-priced inputs and greater competition in their major output
markets. The capacity of many of these
traditional enterprises to initiate new products (or new production methods)
was limited by their existing indebtedness.
Their ability to reduce costs was restricted by the social obligations
that were carried over from the earlier industrial system. Perhaps of greater importance to
the continuing success of economic reform in China, as the market system
became a more controlling element in the price and quantity of most outputs,
markets became more interdependent.
For example, fewer employment opportunities with township and village
enterprises added to the desire for rural-to-urban migration and this
increased the need for more urban infrastructure. New (or different) economic and
social needs were therefore created by the market economy. Although some of these were predictable,
the time necessary for authorisation was in some cases substantial,
especially if a new law required old laws to be amended (or if a new law
enacted by an upper-level government conflicted with those of a lower-level government). Similarly, with increased trade among
neighbouring provinces, implementation of an authorisation or regulation by
one provincial government often conflicted with similar implementation for
another provincial government. To summarise the role of the
state in economic activities in China, during the 1980s the authorisation and
regulatory function of the state focused on creating an environment within
which the regulation of economic activities would become more market
oriented. The implementation function
followed the principles that were established for a more open and a more
decentralised system. Public sector personnel at
provincial and municipal/county levels became more involved in promotional
activities. These functions are
generally regarded as being successful, although, as noted above,
implementation costs may have increased through a duplication of efforts
among the various levels of government. During the early 1990s, the
authorisation and regulatory function of the state began to focus on
administrative adjustments that were necessary to maintain macroeconomic
stability. Inflationary pressures
occupied much of the attention of administrators and rising unemployment
following cut-backs in state-owned enterprises became a major issue in the
first half of that decade. The East Asian crisis that began
in 1997 highlighted weaknesses in regional financial systems and motivated a
number of authorising and regulatory initiatives of the central government in
China. A new securities law, a reorganisation
of the People's Bank of China and supervisory committees for the large state
banks were important outcomes of these efforts. Implementation of these new laws
was apparently easier with the creation of new institutional
arrangements. For example, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission that was formed in 1992 is implementing the
securities law. New regional offices
of the People's Bank of China were created and the Product Quality Law
established a new group of inspectors who issue public warnings for
non-compliance. Little occurred during the 1990s
to foster a re-orientation of the public sector, especially with lower levels
of government, to increase their capacity to implement continuing
administrative adjustments. We focus on
this aspect from the remainder of the discussion. |
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The judicial system in most
countries has both an interpretative function and an enforcement
function. These functions are
sometimes difficult to separate and therefore do not fit easily into the
simplified scheme shown in Fig. 1.
Nevertheless, there is a connection. While the interpretative
function of the judicial system has an impact on the content and application
of rules that are established by the authorising and regulatory function of
the state, the judiciary depends upon a prior authorisation through which the
relevant law was initiated. The
interpretative function is therefore a form of implementation. In China this is clearly distinguished
with an interpretative function given to the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress.6 As a dispute resolution
procedure the judicial system operates in a manner that is similar to a range
of informal resolution schemes within the public sector. Additionally, as an instrument for
enforcing law, the judicial system is closely related to major industry
“watchdogs” that are part of the state apparatus. A recent report by the
Australian Law Reform Commission, entitled, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System 7 recognised this connection. The Commission recommended that empirical
studies be made of the quality and effectiveness of all such dispute resolution
and “watchdog” schemes with a view to determining their ultimate impact on
the workloads of courts and tribunals. We suggest that this connection
justifies a broadly based framework within which the capability of law
enforcement supervision can be made.
A framework is concerned with a coherent set of ideas for influencing
and initiating action. A framework
does not necessarily emerge fully developed.
It may evolve over a period of time; but it must have at any given
time a series of component-ideas that can be used as reference points in the
evolutionary process. We are aware that reforms in
China have generally been made in a step-by-step manner, rather than
instituting a single, comprehensive program that includes a range of reforms affecting
most aspects of public sector functions.
The choice made by China has proved to be successful in creating
durable outcomes.8
We nevertheless suggest that the connection between enforcement of
Forestry Law and Environmental Protection Law with other types of
enforcement, and with other public sector functions, requires that some
attention be given to a broadly based framework. |
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Australia is frequently
mentioned by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as an example
of public sector reforms that were aimed at making the functions of
government more transparent, competitive and results-oriented. Although these objectives apply to most
countries, the manner in which the reforms are instituted will necessarily
differ as a result of many social, cultural and historical factors. We do not suggest that
Australia's public sector is or should be a “model” for China's public
sector. Nevertheless, some of the
ways in which public sector institutions were strengthened in Australia are
worthy of consideration. A major
objective of this seminar is to learn from the experience of other countries,
and that is frequently more effective if it is built up in a case-by-case
manner. Written Comments about Policies
from the Public Sector During the 1980s, the central
government in Australia initiated the practice of requiring written comments
from various ministries and agencies on the proposals for new policies (or
policy changes) from other ministries and agencies. This accomplished two objectives. First, in order to issue
constructive comments, it was necessary for the various ministries and
agencies to acquire some of the knowledge that was previously reserved for
one ministry or agency. This
increased the degree of flexibility in the public sector and enabled
transfers of personnel from one ministry to another to be made more easily. Second, the comments gave an
indication of implementation capability.
This, in turn, led to changes in the authorisation or regulation for
the purpose of tailoring it to suit the capability. It also highlighted areas where improvements in capability were
required. Success depended upon adherence
to a fairly rigid timetable in order to avoid long delays in the policy
planning stage. Not all ministries
and agencies viewed the task of commenting on the activities of other
ministries with equal seriousness, but generally those with interests similar
to those contained in a proposal accepted the task as an important part of
their own work plan. The desire to
gain a better understanding of the work plans of similar ministries became
part of their medium-term institutional strategies. In applying this to China, we
note that discussions frequently occur among representatives of various
ministries, departments and offices.
However, most of these discussions are organised to suit particular
issues and are arranged as a special occasion, such as this seminar. These discussions and seminars are of
course important and should be continued.
We recommend that a procedure be established for regular and more
continuous exchanges of opinion about the tasks and work plans of the public
sector organisations that are represented here today. Cost of New Proposals Balanced
Against Offsetting Savings The principal objective of
public sector reform in Australia was to allow changes in policies to occur
without adding increasingly larger amounts to government spending. During the 1970s and early 1980s, non-government
organisations called attention to the apparent desire of some ministries and
agencies to increase their size, and therefore their influence within the
public sector, by proposing an ever-expanding range of new policies and
programs. Other ministries and
agencies then followed in the same manner and this added substantially to the
size of government. Similar experiences occurred in
other countries in relation to government regulations. Increased complexity in the regulatory
process not only added to the cost of doing business, for those enterprises
that were being regulated, but it also increased the number of personnel
employed by the regulators. This was
one of the most pressing arguments that led to a general downsizing of the
public sector in most countries. The need to find offsetting
savings also encouraged innovations in administrative procedures. Non-government people cannot evaluate
government administration easily or quickly (though they may have useful
input for improving the procedures).
Public sector innovations are more easily obtained from within the
public sector, but some form of incentive is generally necessary to stimulate
the innovative process. In relation to Forestry Law and
Environmental Law, cost savings arise mainly from the capacity to prevent
severe damage to forests and to the environment. While the cost of this damage is difficult to connect directly
to compliance with a specific forestry or environmental laws, it is important
to initiate the thought process that evaluates of the benefits of enforcement
and compliance, relative to the costs of achieving the enforcement and
compliance. On the issue of measurement, the
World Bank, Asian Development Bank and most bilateral aid agencies in OECD
countries have evolved a process for benefit-cost analysis that can be
applied to individual projects. We
have had some experience with this type of analysis and recognise that the
quantitative procedures generally lack precision. However, the important contribution that stems from the
analysis, is not the final figure, but rather the systematic procedure of
collecting (listing) the various costs and the benefits. We recommend that supervisory personnel in China’s regulatory
divisions give greater attention to measures of the costs and benefits of law
enforcement and use these measures to develop a comprehensive work plan. Measuring Public Sector
Performance From Outcomes The public sector at the central
government level in Australia is almost fully oriented toward performance
based upon results or outcomes. The
preference for “outcomes” rather than “outputs” is difficult to trace, but
seems to have developed from limitations associated with measuring physical
units of outputs.9 Perhaps the most common use of
“outcome” is in relation to a policy or plan, and is frequently linked to the
stated objectives of a specific activity.
We use, for purposes of illustration, the objectives of this seminar: It is the aim of this
international seminar to organise the experts from home and abroad to
exchange views on the issues of legal enforcement supervision, to pass on the
successful practices and experiences of overseas legal supervision machinery,
and to learn from the foreign experience so as to benefit the construction of
our own legal supervision environment. A likely outcome of the seminar
is a list of priorities that will subsequently be examined by the
participating public sector agencies for the purpose of initiating reforms in
the way they supervise the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. It might appear that an
“outcome” is a mere restatement of the objectives, but it does more than
that. In order to add value, the restatement
must be put in such a way that it can be confirmed later as a specific result
(or set of results) of the activity.
This gives rise to two benefits.
First, it focuses attention during the activity on what is to be
achieved. In that sense, it helps to
avoid wasted or ineffective effort.
Second, it provides a convenient basis to assessing whether the time,
effort and expense that went into the activity can be justified. Applying this to enforcement of
environmental laws, outcomes should extend beyond a “target output” of
inspecting a fixed number of factories for emission standards or imposing a
specific number of fines. Enforcement
outcomes should include a realistic target for environmental improvements,
together with a human resources plan to achieve those targets. We recommend that enforcement supervision in China adopt a “outcomes
approach” that links feasible and realistic implementation objectives to
human resource requirements. These outcomes should be stated
in such a way that they can be subsequently confirmed in relation to both the
input of resources as well as the implementation output, with due
consideration given to qualitative factors. Educating Enforcement Officials The Australian Law Reform
Commission (reference given in note 6) made a strong case for improvements in
education, training and accountability for the entire legal profession. Emphasis was placed on traditional members
of the profession (lawyers, judges and members of tribunals), but a similar
statement could be made that includes public sector personnel engaged in
enforcement activities. Education, training and
accountability are of utmost importance in getting the supervisory structures
right, achieving reform within the entire system and maintaining high standards
of performance. A healthy
professional culture requires lifelong learning and takes ethical concerns
seriously. The Commission also found that a
training program for professional skills that is properly conceived and
executed should not be a narrow technical or vocational exercise. Rather, it should be fully based upon an
appropriate mixture of theory and practice, devoted to the refinement of the
high order intellectual skills, and calculated to create a sense of ethical
propriety, as well as and professional and social responsibility.10 Professional practitioners in
Australia were queried to determine the type of skills that were missing from
their basic education. Communication
skills were identified most frequently.
Skills of critical appraisal of information and research, including
statistics, were also mentioned. We recommend that the educational requirements for law enforcement
supervisors and officials be comprehensively studied in China for the purpose
of designing a professional training program that would contribute to the
achievement of specific objectives. These objectives should include:
(a) adopting the right supervisory structures, (b) achieving reform within
the entire enforcement system, and (c) maintaining high standards of
performance. Improving
Intergovernmental Relations in China We believe that the
administrative system linking the three levels of government will be placed
under increasing pressure as a result of the competing needs of smaller jurisdictions.
The new Legislation Law, which was adopted on 15 March 2000 and will become
effective on 1 July 2000, will help to avoid, and hopefully eliminate, the
conflicts and inconsistencies between national laws and laws of lower-level
governments. We note that the new law
clarifies the separation of law-making authority among the three levels in
China, and in doing so it conveys elements of a federal system of
government. Perhaps more importantly
for supervision of law enforcement, the new law requires lower-level
governments to amend or repeal, on a timely basis, any decree or provision
that contravenes a national law or administrative regulation.11 Specific authority is given to
higher-levels of government in China to review and approve local decrees
before they are implemented.12 Authority is also given to higher-level governments to amend or
cancel existing decrees or administrative rules or local rules that are
considered to be inappropriate.13 Enforcement of any such
amendments or cancellations is nevertheless a major concern. Provincial governors and mayors of
municipal governments will be assessed mainly on their contributions in their
own jurisdictions, and compliance with higher-level laws may not receive
priority treatment by the lower-level public sector. Lower level governments will
need to know why their legislation must be changed and may need to be
convinced that the national laws and regulations are better then their local
laws and regulations. Regular
briefings by the higher-level government may accomplish part of this
objective, but we think that may not be enough. Lower level governments are
likely to require technical assistance to guide them in the necessary
compliance and in enforcing the resulting laws and regulations. We can suggest that the procedures adopted
by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in giving technical
assistance to borrowing countries, so that they may more easily comply with
the respective bank’s requirements, could serve as a model. Bank staff or external
consultants are assigned to the appropriate ministry for designated periods
of time. The type of assistance
required is generally determined by negotiation between the bank and the
relevant ministry. Personnel assigned
to the technical assistant tasks are given specific instructions and their
work is carefully monitored. We recommend that technical assistance be provided to lower-level
governments by higher-level governments for improved supervision of specific
laws and regulations that follow from the authorisation and regulatory
function of the higher-level governments. We believe that this will build
stronger institutional arrangements between central ministries and
counterpart departments in the lower-level governments. It will also lead to a transfer of
knowledge and experience that will enhance capability at all levels. We suggest that a stronger institutional
linkage will become increasingly more important as China develops more fully
its “rule by law”. |
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The suggestion of an Australian
Academy of Law was made by the Australian Law Reform Commission (in paragraph
2.115 of the reference cited at note 7).
The proposed academy would have an institutional standing that is
approximately that of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA),
the Australian Academy of Humanities (AAH) and the Australian Academy of
Science (AAS). A similar suggestion could be
made for a Chinese Academy of Law.
Such an organisation could draw together the various strands of the
legal system to facilitate effective intellectual interchange through
discussion and research in areas of concern.
It could nurture coalitions of interest and could have a special focus
on issues of professionalism (including ethics) and on education and
training. Since such an academy is only
now being proposed in Australia, we cannot give you an account of Australian
experiences. We note, however, from
the comments of the Australian Law Reform Commission, that the Singapore
Academy of Law and the American Law Institute comprise similar bodies. We suggest that a Chinese
Academy of Law could give increased status and recognition within China to
the “rule of law”. This would greatly
assist the task of law enforcement and would also allow on-going linkages
with similar academies in other countries. The need for such on-going
linkages will become more important when China becomes a member of the World
Trade Organisation. Trade disputes
often arise as a result of incomplete information about the way one nation
makes and enforces trade laws in a "uniform, impartial and
reasonable" manner. Information that is not
up-to-date creates misunderstandings about enforcement of laws. For example, a recent opinion by Stanley
Lubman of the Stanford Law School stated: In addition, [China] should
provide for procedures to challenge legislation, both prospective and already
in effect. This would be an
innovation, because under current Chinese practice, administrative agencies
can be challenged by affected persons or organisations if they allegedly
misapply laws in specific cases; but general rules cannot be challenged as
illegal or as conflicting with other laws or regulations. China should commit to repair this
omission.14 This has now been changed by the
Legislation Law mentioned earlier,15 but a delay in
recognising that change focuses attention on what has already been done and
therefore creates an erroneous impression of the tasks remaining. A timely exchange of information is of
vital importance in preventing conflicts, and a highly regarded organisation
is required for the purpose exchanging that information. Need
for Incentives We mentioned in an earlier
section that economic reform during the 1980s proceeded well because of the
financial incentives that were built into the reforms. Subsequent reforms were more difficult
mainly because they lacked corresponding financial incentives. Success in reforming the
environment for law enforcement supervision in China, and in reforming other
aspects of the legal system, will require other incentives to be created. As the reform process expands it will also
be necessary to neutralise disincentives. It is generally easier to
prescribe the necessary ingredients of the reform process than to create the
incentives. From the economic point
of view, the cost of the incentives must not be greater than the benefits
that are expected to arise from the reform.
This is even more difficult to determine. Whether the reform process is
step-by-step or comprehensive, it is necessary to pause periodically to
ensure that the costs are not exceeding the benefits. The decision-making process is likely to
be easier for forestry and environmental protection since the residents of
the community will have visible evidence of the benefit. They must nevertheless be convinced that
the process will achieve visible benefits before they, as individuals,
willingly comply with laws and regulations. Some environmentalists have
suggested that sustainable development begins with individuals who volunteer
to restrict their behaviour, based mainly on faith that others will do the
same. Less faith is required as the
numbers build to the point at which visible benefits appear, but it is then
more difficult to prevent individuals from refusing to comply since they view
their individual actions as insignificant to the continued improvements. This means that the environment
for law enforcement supervision must continuously re-invent itself and change
to suit changing circumstances. It is
nevertheless important to get the right structure with each change, since
otherwise the tasks of achieving compliance will be increasingly more
difficult. We hope some of the suggestions
we made will help to focus attention on obtaining the “right structure”. We cannot state what the structure should
be, since it must inevitably have characteristics that suit China’s specific
law enforcement needs. Seminars such
as this one are important steps in achieving that outcome. |
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1. Australia's exports to China in 1999 were $A4,084
million and imports were A$6,578 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade). U. S. exports to China in
1999 were US$13,118 million and imports were US$81,786 (U.S. Census, Foreign
Trade Division). The population of
the U. S. is 274.6 million. The current
exchange rate of US$0.6071 per Australian dollar was applied. 2. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
“People's Republic of China, Trade and Investment”, from Country/Economic
Information at Internet site: http://www.dfat.gov.au. 3. World Bank, The State in a Changing World, World
Development Report 1997, p 20. 4. Traditionally, the state is
said to have certain “core” functions including national defence, ensuring
the security of persons and property, educating the citizenry and enforcing
contracts. See World
Bank (note 3), p. 20. On this basis,
other functions are “non-core” and need not be supplied entirely or directly
by the state. These other functions
should nevertheless contribute in a measurable way to satisfying social and
economic needs, and the state has the responsibility of ensuring that
adequate supplies are available. 5. The diagram is a variation of one used by Anwar
Shan, “Balance, Accountability and Responsiveness: Lessons About
Decentralisation”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2021. 6. Refer to Section Four
(Article 42) of The Legislation Law of the People’s
Republic of China. 7. Available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/89/. 8. In comparison, public sector
reforms that are undertaken on a comprehensive basis often require frequent adjustments
or “fine tuning” to suit particular situations. See Michele de Laine, “International Themes in Public Service
Reform”, Background Paper 3, 1997-98, Parliament of
Australia, Parliamentary Library, 22 September 1997. 9. A number of published discussions
relating to the undesirable features of reliance upon physical output as a
measure of performance can be found, but several such
features that are mentioned by Michele de Laine (op. cit. at note 7) are
particularly good. 10. Australian Law Reform Commission,
op. cit. (at note 6), paragraph 2.85. 11. Stated in Article 64 of The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China. 12. Stated in
Article 63 of The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China. 13. Stated in Article 88 of The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China. 14. “China's Accession to the WTO: Unfinished Business
in Geneva”, by Stanley Lubman, dated 6 May 2000 in ChinaOnline
[http://www.chinaonline.com]. 15. Article 90 of the Legislation
Law states: “Where any state organ and social group, enterprise or
non-enterprise institution or citizen other than the bodies
enumerated above, deem that an administrative regulation, local decree,
autonomous decree or special decree contravenes the Constitution or a
national law, it may make a written proposal to the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress for review, and the office of operation of the
Standing Committee shall study such proposal, and where necessary, it shall distribute
such proposal to the relevant special committees for review and
comments.” The translation was by
John Jiang and is published in ChinaOnline [http://www.chinaonline.com]. Return to the top of this page. |
